China's rise in Asia is clearly hugely significant. But it is important to retain a sense of balance in considering what has at times become a rather emotive issue -for example, in those analyses that are primarily concerned about the implications of China's rise for US power in the region (and sometimes beyond as well). At times, the search for new sources of a China challenge, and the desire to highlight the urgent need to respond, can give the impression that China has already usurped the US and is shaping the regional order as it pleases. This understanding tends to underplay the residual power of the US in East Asia, and can lead to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and individual Southeast Asian states being conceived as passive responders to Chinese initiatives, rather than possessing any sources of authority and influence themselves.
2 At times, the casual observer could be forgiven for assuming that Japan had abandoned the region to Chinese influence and wholly eclipsed by China as the region's (sole) economic pole. Moreover, as China's regional power increases -or is perceived to increase -then the desire to find a balance has led to an increasing regional desire to see India play a greater role and perhaps change The second part of the paper then considers the main sources of China's growing influence in the region. Despite disagreement over the whys and whens and how fars, there is a consensus of sorts over how China has increased its influence in the region.
To varying degrees, the focus is on a combination of diplomatic and economic drivers: the simple fact of the size and rapid growth of the Chinese economy and resulting trade flows, the diplomatic engagement of individual regional states and ASEAN as an organisation, the proactive promotion of formal institutionalised regional economic cooperation, and the increased significance of China as a source (rather than just a recipient) of foreign direct investment. 3 Rather than simply repeat this consensus here, this paper instead focuses on a more contested potential source of Chinese power in the debates over the importance of ideas and the promotion of China's 'soft power' in Asia.
While the Chinese authorities are attempting to establish a new idea of what China is,
what it stands for and how it acts, it seems that those who are most convinced about the rise of Chinese 'soft power' are either those who conflate ideational factors with harder (material) sources of power and influence, or those who are most eager to influence a change in Washington's foreign policy. In reality, it appears that where China has made most headway in attaining its objectives in the region and aligning others to Chinese interests, it is through working within existing frameworks and norms; and in one case through being more "liberal" than others in the promotion of regional free trade agreements.
Indeed, perhaps ironically, a key source of Chinese power is the assumption by others that it either has it -be that the external identification of soft power, or more tangible and "harder" sources of influence. Or maybe more correctly, it is the assumption that China will have this power and influence sometime soon. So alongside the reality of what China has done to date, and often based on well founded considerations, fears of what China might do and become in the future might play some role in creating the power that was feared in the first place.
Changing Chinese Policy: When and Why?

Security Agendas
Official Chinese statements constantly re-iterate the line that China does not and will never seek hegemony; neither in Asia nor elsewhere. Of course making bold statements about the desire to achieve hegemony would probably result in a hardening of positions against China. And from a security perspective, preventing a coalescence/alliance of forces that might threaten China's (security) interests is at the heart of China's changed regional policy. To be sure, the threat level is not the same as in the 1950s, 60s and early 70s, when Chinese policy makers were all but convinced that war with one or other of the superpowers (and perhaps even both) was inevitable. But if anybody had the ability to 'challenge Chinese territorial integrity' in the late 1990s it was the United States. 4 And even if actual conflict was not likely, there was a real concern in Beijing that the regional order would obstruct the attainment of national interests if left unchecked. Hence the need to build balancing relationships with regional states to (at the very least) neutralise their desire to contain China; 5 to rebuild a triangular security environment in the region.
So if military security was the driver, when did policy change? A common response is that 1996 was the key year, and US support for Taiwan during the missile crisis the key event. 6 Others date the change earlier in the decade, and point to the re-assertion of a 'good neighbour' policy (mulin zhengce 睦邻政策) 7 based on the fear of potential international isolation after Tiananmen. 8 While Suisheng Zhao accepts that this change was largely driven by great power concerns, he also points to the growing recognition that China's security considerations were best served by proactive engagement with Southeast Asian nations individually, and ASEAN multilaterally. For example, in the security realm, China and ASEAN (nations and the organisation) had a shared interest in dealing with marine piracy and transnational crime. A decade later, the SARS outbreak also illuminated the importance of information sharing and policy coordination to prevent new threats to human if not national security. Thus "old" and "new" security concerns came together to make regional engagement the logical strategic choice.
5 This is a common theme in the security literature on China's regional relations. This power is also seen as being enhanced by the promotion of bilateral economic agreements that ensure access to the Chinese market to friendly states, and by using emerging multilateral forms as a way of supporting such 'commercial diplomacy' to compete with Japan and the US for support and even dominance in the region. Threat' theory. 31 The specific term was dropped relatively quickly-partly because it generated as much attention on the 'rise' as it did on this rise being peaceful -and And here we hit one of the conundrums of contemporary Chinese policy -the extent to which China is a status quo power, or whether it is an alternative to existing models and norms. We seem, then, to be in a relatively new era of Chinese ideational persuasion through the creation -and 'creation' is an important word here -of an idea of an historical regional order that prospered when China was strong and in a leadership position.
Chinese values are being promoted (and not just in the region) by referring back to idealised golden ages in a form of Occidentalism or 'reverse orientalism' in that they are depicted as the mirror image of all that the West (for which primarily read the US) between the creation of an idea of the past to suit official policy on one side, and intellectual endeavours to rethink China's place in the world on the other. The latter refers to an ongoing process of (re)thinking the nature of Chinese identity -an identity that is under threat from either 'globalisation' (however defined), or western cultural hegemony, or both.
It is difficult to pin down this process and pigeon hole it into a single school or approach. The term 'New Left' has become relatively widely used to refer to those who have highlighted the negative consequences of the transition from socialism and propose alternatives to embracing globalisation as a means of promoting development. 43 But not all are concerned with economic paradigms and many respects, the work of some of the most influential of critical thinkers attempts to go beyond a simple 'left-right' dichotomy and instead search for distinctive Chinese understandings of modernity. 44 For Guo Jian, the main goal of these 'Chinese postists':
is to deconstruct Western knowledge of China and at the same time to explore various possibilities to reconstruct China' s own cultural identity and national subjectivity 45 In doing so, they engage in processes that are similar to the state project of depicting China in a new way to an external audience -but in terms of method, epistemology and entomology, they are very different processes that should not be confused of combined into a single Chinese rethinking of history.
International Norms and (Im)morality
In terms of constructing a new international order, the Chinese alternative is based on four main pillars of foreign policy: a commitment to multilateralism underpinned by the central role of the UN as the guarantor of global security; a commitment to consultation and dialogue rather than force as a means of settling disputes; a commitment to global economic development with the developed world taking a greater share of the responsibility for promoting growth elsewhere; and a 'spirit of inclusiveness' for all societies and cultures to coexist as equal stakeholders in the global order. was 'inevitable', but recognised that acknowledging inevitability 'is not the same as liking it'. 59 It might be true that more and more students in the region are learning Chinese; that more and more policy makers and diplomats are considering Chinese interests before they make their final decisions; and more and more businessmen are also courting China. But this might in large part be because they think that China's rise to regional dominance is going to happen whatever they do or think, and so it's best to make the most of this inevitability.
China's Rise or America's Decline?
Another key problem is that it is all but impossible to disentangle the study of China's regional relations from conceptions of US (in) All of these studies of course about China, but they are also in many respects for the US. They are designed at least in part to influence the way in which US policy makers think about and act towards China by first assessing the nature of this thing called To be sure, this position is towards the extreme of interpretations and there are others that point in different directions. For example, Ellen Frost sees little that attracts pointing to the 'increasingly archaic' political system as something that repels rather than appeals. 76 Surveys suggest that the appeal of the United States is still extremely strong (and stronger than China's) in the region, 77 and in responding to Pempel's persuasive argument that the Bush administration 'bungled Asia', 78 Michael Green (who was part of that administration) found no evidence that Asian elites were abandoning Washington for Beijing:
rather than turning to an imagined 'Beijing consensus' on authoritarianism and non-interference in internal affairs, Asia's other major powers from India to Japan and Indonesia are emphasizing universal norms and their own democratic identity, even as they seek closer pan-Asian modes of cooperation.
None of this is meant to minimize the significant 79 Within China itself, various reviews of the debates on Soft Power find no consensus over whether external views and perceptions of China provide an asset or an obstacle for the attainment of national interests. But there is a consensus of sorts that anything that China is doing in soft power promotion has some way to go before the attraction of the US is eclipsed. nationalist constituency is a caricature of a more complicated position. But like most caricatures, it is an exaggeration that is built on at least some element of reality.
We can unpack this caricature by pointing to the diversity of domestic Chinese audiences, ideas and interests. Shen has identified a range of diverse voices and positions within the broadly defined 'nationalist' constituency itself (which makes it much harder for the Chinese government to respond to nationalist pressures than a blunt understanding of a single nationalist position would suggest). 82 We can also unpack it by thinking of different external audiences. For example, as already noted, discourses of the appeal of China as alternative tend to focus on developing states in Latin America and most often Africa. Moreover, whilst the rhetoric of official China highlights the differences between Chinese actions and expectations compared to those of western states, the idea of China as alternative is at least as much inferred from without as promoted from within.
Despite concerns about the promotion of a Chinese alternative in Asia, the evidence seems to suggest that attitudes and opinions of China seem to improve as it increasingly transforms to meet existing global norms. Asia has become more enamoured with China as it has abandoned its old positions and regional leaders 'welcome China's penchant for making deals rather than fomenting revolution and applaud the recent flurry of regional and bilateral free trade agreements'.
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The same seems to be true in the economic realm. Earlier, we noted that Zhang and Tang believe that the Chinese leadership is using trade and investment as a means of obtaining security objectives by establishing a Sinocentric regional economic order.
But this attempt to place China at the centre of the region is more a consequence of conforming than of confronting, and results from the changing ideational basis of
Chinese foreign policy and the increasing acceptance of 'neoliberalism's core belief that economic interdependence creates common interest and lessens the probability of conflict'.
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It might be the case that China's turn to embrace the region has undermined the power of the US in Asia. But ironically, one of the great challenges to US power, it seems, is -its just that its not as cataclysmic as some of the headline figures pointing to exports accounting for 40 per cent of Chinese GDP might suggest.
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It is almost a contractual obligation for a scholar who works on China to point out that the Chinese word for crisis is a combination of two characters -the first, wei 危, meaning 'danger' and the second, ji 机 in this context meaning 'opportunity'. So along with the dangers that the crisis has posed for Chinese growth, it also offers opportunities; for example, the opportunity to push for the long desired increase in domestic consumption as a source of growth and to reduce the reliance on low value added exports. The crisis has also provided an opportunity for China on the international scene -for example, the acknowledgement of China as a key player in the evolution of global economic governance mechanisms and institutions as epitomised by China's role in the G20 London Summit in April 2009.
In terms of China's emerging regional power, it is again too early to know what the long term fall out will be. But building on the analysis that has informed this paper, we can make three tentative suggestions. First, growing support for the need to find alternatives to the 'Washington Consensus' model of international financial governance has important regional implications. The need to seek not just alternative economic modes to 'western' neoliberalism but also regional regulatory alternatives 91 The low level of Chinese components and the low level of value added in these processing exports has long been a source of concern within China -yet ironically this seems to have provided a level of insulation from the vagaries of the global economy in a time of crisis. The decline in exports is still serious and has a significant impact on overall growth figures, but does not cut as deep into the economy as a whole as in some other export oriented economies. I explored the process and implications of this pattern of global integration in Shaun Breslin, China and the Global Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).
to global governance appears to have gained support and legitimacy as a result of the current crisis. As Soogil Young argues:
Asia's confidence in the global economic architecture, and by the same token, in its outward-oriented development strategies, has been shaken profoundly 92 Given the size of its economy and in particular its foreign currency reserves, China will inevitably be a major force in any regional arrangement. To be sure, it may have to share influence with others -notably Japan -but both the ideational appeal and structural power of US finance and models in the region are likely to decline (even if obituaries to US power are a tad premature).
Second, the crisis has allowed China's leaders to reinforce the idea of China as a responsible regional actor. Indeed, China has emerged as almost an űber-responsible regional state that is working not just to stabilise its own economy for its own sake, but also to stabilise the regional economy as a whole. Notably, the week after the Finally, while we can debate whether Ramo's promotion of the idea of a 'Beijing Consensus' helps or hinders an understanding of the dynamics of regional relations, his idea that the sheer size of the country and the economy give it a 'magnetic pull' is illuminating. 96 Or as Frost put it, 'the sheer size and dynamism of China's economy' is hugely significant in itself and 'may make explicit diplomatic intervention unnecessary' in getting others to acquiesce to Chinese interests.
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What this suggests then is that that the Chinese authorities don't really need to do or say very much in a proactive manner to push their influence in the region. Simply dealing with their own domestic economic issues and ensuring continued growth could well be enough in itself. Indeed, a key source of China's 'non-hard' power appears to be the way that some in the region (and beyond) base their relations with China today on the (well founded) expectation of continued growth and on what they expect China to become in the future. So in addition to its own sources of power, perhaps China also possesses a form of 'imagined' power in the minds of others. As such, the way that others in the region conceive of and respond to China's rise might become a source of Chinese power and influence in itself. 96 Ramo, The Beijing Consensus. 97 Frost, 'China's Commercial Diplomacy', p. 97.
